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by
PROFESSOR F. GUNTHER EYCK
HENRY L. STIMSON CHAIR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

(Author's Note: I wish to acknowledge
here the gracious help and advice given by the
following persons in connection with
preparation o f this article: Mr. Henry Loomis,
second cousin o f Mr. Stimson and Deputy
Director of the US Information Agency; Dr.
Mabel E. Deutrich, Director of the Old
Military Records Division at the National
Archives; Dr. Herman Kahn, Associate
Librarian, Manuscripts and Archives at Yale
University Library, custodian of the Stimson
Papers; Dr. Kahn's assistant, Mr. David
Maslyn; and the staff o f the US Army Military
History Research Collection at Carlisle
Barracks.)
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Henry L. Stimson's long and distinguished
service to the Nation extended through four
decades a n d five administrations and
encompassed a variety of major offices and
challenges. His stewardship of the State
Department in the crises years of the early
'thirties is as readily and respectfully

Henry L. Stimson as Secretary of War
in Taft's Administration.
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remembered as that of the War Department in
the even more challenging years of the Second
World War.
What is less well known and yet perhaps of
greater factual a n d symbolic significance is
that this illustrious American statesman, at
the age of 72, returned to the same office in
the War Department which he held when first
entering national service in 1911. That two
American Presidents as different in their
policies, personalities, and party affiliations as
William Howard Taft and Franklin D.
Roosevelt should call in two entirely different
situations on the same man to fill the very
important position of Secretary of War is of
19

n o t e w o r t h y uniqueness. These two
appointments reflect not only the political
astuteness of the incumbent Presidents, but
also pay high tribute to Mr. Stimson's
unvarying qualities as an administrator, a
leader, and a public-minded citizen.
T o be sure, there were substantial
differences in the structure and functions, the
issues and problems, the number of people
and offices in the War Department on the eve
of World War I and World War II respectively.
The prime concern of Mr. Stimson in
connection with the latter conflict was the
necessity of winning it, while his primary
interest during his first tenure of this office
was the reorganization of the Army to have it
better prepared for the remote contingency of

had more in common than would appear
possible from their bitter enmity.
Both were assertive, even autocratic men;
both were New Englanders; both were
medical doctors who had risen to the top
positions in the Army as much by their
determination as by their connections. Well
could such a doughty observer as General
John F. Weston remark with evident glee:
"Let the two doctors fight it out. They will
use more strategy and have more war than in
the field."
Actually, the origins of the dramatic and
far-reaching struggle in which Henry Stimson
became personally involved lay nearly a
decade in the past. Since the creation in 1903
of the General Staff Corps, upon the initiative
of Secretary Root, this new service branch
had been in contest, if not conflict, with the
old established bureaus and specifically with
the Adjutant General's Department. This
department, under the very skillful and
powerful direction of Major General
Ainsworth, had increasingly acquired more

war.

The problems facing Secretary Stimson
from 1911 to 1913 included in order of their
importance the role of the General Staff and
specifically of its head, the Chief of Staff; the
reorganization of the tactical structure of the
Army; the length of individual service; the
consolidation of posts and services; staffing
patterns; and, finally, the creation of a
National Defense Council.* Several of these
issues existed before Mr. Stimson took office;
others continued to be felt after he left; all of
t h e m were i n t e r t w i n e d w i t h t h e
constitutional and institutional processes of
the American political system. In order to
accomplish his aims the Secretary had to seek
uncertain support from the President, struggle
with the Congress, balance special interests,
and overcome inertia or hostility from high
military quarters.
Soon after assuming office in 191 1 the
Secretary found himself involved in one of
the fiercest conflicts in the history of the
Army. This conflict centered on the Army's
two most powerful officers, but had deeper
origins and wider significance than merely the
clash of personalities and prerogatives. The
Chief of Staff, Leonard Wood, and the
Adjutant General, Fred Ainsworth, ironically
*Reference is made here only to the problems
facing the Regular Army. The Secretary also had
responsibilities for the Panama Canal, inland water
power, the militia, etc.
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An 11 November 1895 photograph of
Fred C. Ainsworth as a colonel.
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responsibilities, especially after 1904 when he
became head of the newly established Military
Secretary's Office.*
Not until Major General Wood became
Chief of Staff in July 19 10 were these powers
first questioned and then challenged. Wood
aspired to making the General Staff not only
the brain but the nerve center of a
r e o r g a n i z e d and revitalized Army.
Specifically, he wanted it to act as a superior
coordinating organism to whose supervision
and d i r e c t i o n all other bureaus or
departments were subject. Ainsworth, by
contrast, had little use for what he called
pejoratively the "general stuff." If anything,
he favored an expansion of powers of his
branch to include the General Staff and the
Inspector General's Department. His focus
was that of a desk officer whose eyes were on
administrative detail and whose activities were
bounded by Washington. Wood, on the other
hand, had considerable troop and overseas
experience and thought of the Army in terms
of national military policies.
Relations between the Chief of Staff and
the Adjutant General, at first cordial, quickly
soured as the battle for control shaped up and
tempers flared. The battle opened rather
inconspicuously with a controversy over the
then existing practice of excessive records
keeping. Ainsworth, who had made his
reputation as an outstanding administrator in
the handling of this paper work, resented the

were friends of Theodore Roosevelt, who
remained a very important person even while
out of office and had something to do with
their respective appointments. Mr. Stimson at
first attempted to give Ainsworth an objective
hearing, but admitted that he had not as yet
"a sufficient grasp" to either understand or
answer the contentions of the Adjutant
General. The latter strongly complained of
"usurpation" of powers by the Chief of Staff.
The climax of the conflict over ultimate
authority was yet to come. Early in
September 1911 the battle of the memos was
renewed. General Wood requested that the
Adjutant General limit his recommendations
on appointments of commanding officers for
recruiting depots to a list prepared by the
Chief of Staff. Ainsworth, who had other
candidates as well as other ideas in mind,
furiously charged that this request constituted
not only an usurpation of control in an area
under his jurisdiction but also an alleged
vindictiveness against his nominees.
Unfortunately, Ainsworth's objections were
couched in such strong terms as to cause
Wood to accuse him of insubordination and
to ask the Secretary for support.
Stimson lost no time in making his position
clear and in taking, however gently, the
Adjutant General to task. In a 19 September
letter he acknowledged Ainsworth's zeal and
concern, but admonished him not to ascribe
ulterior motives to those "with whom we

services which h a d become General
Ainsworth's responsibility since 1904. Thus,
the two contenders for supremacy were
locked in decisive combat and the new
Secretary could hardly remain for long either
an amused or bemused onlooker.
Stimson's involvement was of both a
professional and personal nature. He. was a
friend of General Wood and the two men

himself formally to the concept, espoused by
Wood, that the Chief of Staff as the highest
ranking military officer would act in behalf of
the President and the Secretary of War.
General Ainsworth, however, was neither
ready nor willing to concede this point in its
totality. His position was facilitated by the
fact that neither the law of 14 February 1903
n o r subsequent amendments had fully
delimited the authority of either the General
Staff or its chief. There were repeated
references to " s u p e r v i s i o n " over all other
branches, but Secretary Root himself had
opposed any stronger wording or authority.

*The new office combined the Records and
Pension and t he Adjutant General 's Offices but was
reconstituted in 1907 with Ainsworth's support as
the Adjutant General Department.
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The final opportunity of challenge by
either side arose at the turn from 191 1 to
191 2. In the continued efforts at streamlining
administrative practices and tightening the
antiquated organizational machinery, the War
Department reformers led by Wood and
backed by Stimson leveled their sights at the
mainstay of the Adjutant General's control
system, the muster rolls. General Ainsworth
had greatly facilitated the utilization of these
rolls by the introduction of a card index file.
He was as convinced of its usefulness as of its
symbolic importance to his successful tenure
of office. When some of Wood's "young men"
recommended replacing the rolls by the
Descriptive List, a transferable record of each
soldier, General Ainsworth became incensed
and determined to lay his professional life on
the line.
He looked upon General Wood's request of
15 December 1911 (to state in writing any
objections to the replacement of the muster
rolls) as the ultimate challenge to his
authority and expertise. Consequently, he did
not heed the request. Only after repeated
prodding did he finally draw up an elaborate
answer whose technical effectiveness was
compromised by the scathing language
employed. Wood, with this reply in hand, had
no choice but to put it before Mr. Stimson,
who rightly felt personally affronted by such
remarks as "incompetent amateurs" whose
proposals would be "scorned by honorable
men."
The Secretary called on President Taft and
his old friend Root for advice and support.
Assured by both men, he proceeded with
Root's help to draw up a letter which
suspended General Ainsworth from duty on
14 February 1912. In this letter Stimson
censured Ainsworth for his "intolerance of
subordination" and his "insolence to
superiors." And in his own D i a r y he remarked
that Ainsworth had opposed "all progressive
measures ever since the administration of Mr.
Root."
Believing when so challenged "in striking
hard," Mr. Stimson prepared to have the
suspended Adjutant General court-martialed.
Only the intervention of powerful members
of Congress averted this predicament and
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Major General Leonard Wood, Army Chief o f Staff
during Stimson's first tenure of office as
Secretary of War.

General Ainsworth was allowed to retire. The
battle royal appeared won for the reformers
and Henry Stimson wrote to his father that
Ainsworth's influence "even in Congress has
departed." But on this score he proved to be
badly mistaken. The battle with the Congress
was just about to begin.
Though the Adjutant General had been
physically removed f r o m t h e War
D e p a r t m e n t , h i s spirit- if n o t his
presence-forthwith reasserted itself with a
vengeance in the precincts of Capitol Hill.
Over the years, he had built a very strong,
perhaps unique, relationship with the
Congress, and had become the primary link
between the Army and Legislature. Many
Congressional leaders were among his best
friends as, for instance, James Hay and
Francis Warren-the respective chairmen of
the military committees in the House and the
Senate.
These men now took up where Ainsworth
had been compelled to leave off. Secretary

Stimson quickly was requested to make
available to the House all of the documents
bearing on the Ainsworth case. The
Democratic majority of the Military Affairs
Committee soon afterwards criticized the
Secretary's action as unwarranted and
vindictive and the cry was raised of "a .
Drey fus-like" conspiracy.
Worse was to follow. The House had loaded
up the Army Appropriation Bill with
substantive provisions that were objectionable
to the War Department reformers and passed
it within two days of Ainsworth's resignation.
The Senate, however, struck out all riders and
the bill went to a conferees' session. As a
result of deliberations there a compromise
was reached. Several of the bill's more
objectionable features were retained and
others added. Among the more troublesome
items were the lengthening of service with the
colors to five years (two years more than
originally advocated by Stimson and Wood);
the requirement for the sanction of a
Congressional study commission before the
Executive Branch could close an "obsolete"
post; a reduction in the number of General
Staff officers from 45 to 36; and last but not
least a proviso which stated, as Root put it,
that "no man whose initials were L. W. could
serve as Chief of Staff."
Stimson and Wood easily could guess who
was behind these provisions and realized that
once more they would have to stand and
fight. The Secretary tried his utmost to
convince his Republican friends and the
"progressive" Democrats in the Senate of the
disadvantages of the bill. His efforts proved in
vain. The bill cleared the Senate by three
votes and the House by a wide margin.
Mr. Stimson was aware that at stake here
were not only the careers of his close
associates, perhaps even his own, but also the
very reforms promoted by him and General
Wood. His last recourse now was the
President. Mr. Taft was not easily persuaded.
He was none too fond of "the stormy petrel,"
as he had characterized Wood. Moreover, he
needed more than ever support from such
influential Republicans as Senator Warren,
now that on the eve of the GOP convention in
Chicago a rift with Teddy Roosevelt seemed
23

most likely. In a meeting with the President,
Warren hinted strongly that if Wood were
dropped, he would see to it that the
appropriations bill would be passed without
objectionable riders.
Stimson, who occasionally felt that he had
to take the President's fist in "trying to drive
it forward for him," succeeded, however, in
convincing Taft that should Wood be replaced
now under Congressional pressure, this would
be tantamount to a limitation of the
Presidential choice in the appointment of the
Chief of Staff. The President ultimately
refused to yield. On 5 June 1912 he advised
Warren, upon the urgings of Stimson and
Root, that he could "for the time being" not
agree, since it would look too much like a
case of "stand and deliver."
Mr. Stimson realized at once that stronger
measures of persuasion as well as of dissuasion
were needed. He drafted a veto message which
summarized all his principal objections to the
appropriations bill. His cabinet colleagues
agreed to support this veto draft and
President Taft commented that it sounded
"authoritative." Yet the President waited for
three days in the hope that it could be put off
until after the GOP convention, finally signing
it on 17 June 1912. The Congressional
opposition was taken aback. They had
expected neither the President's firmness nor
the Secretary's toughness.
Stimson had made clear beyond doubt his
views as well as his determination regarding
reforms. Speaking in rebuttal for the Chief
Executive, the Secretary elaborated in the
v e t o d r a f t o n t h e following points
summarized below:
First, the Presidential power of
appointment to "the most important
military position" that of the Chief of
Staff, would be much limited. A premium
would be placed on the eligibility of
officers with mere routine service while
those who had come up fast due to their
exceptional abilities would be excluded.
Finally, the proposed legislation would
confine the choice for the principal staff
position to men with the least staff
experience.

Second, the requested reduction of the
number of General Staff officers would
cripple "the most important corps of the
Army." This corps performed essential
work in devising "a consistent military
policy" and in creating a restructured
Army organization. The detail system of
a maximum of four years service with the
General Staff should be preserved as
being most conducive to an effective
organization and composition of that
corps.
Third, arbitrary limitations on the
length of detached service would deprive
certain departments or units of all or
most of their qualified officers.
Fourth, the lengthening of service with
the colors from three to four years would
make "difficult or impossible" the
creation of a proper reserve force.
Fifth, the appointment by Congress of
a commission on Army posts would
"deprive the regularly constituted
authorities, notably the President and the
Secretary of War, of all voice in the
formulation of one of the most important
policies now confronting the
Nation. . . ."
Sixth, the contention that great savings
would be effected by the bill was
"unfounded." Close examination showed
the contrary to be true with an estimated
deficit of $2 1/4 million.
On most of the issues outlined in the veto
message the conflict continued for some
months. In an exact replica of the first
go-around, the House reinstated the same bill
that had been vetoed, and the Senate then
struck out the riders. At the conferees'
sessions, however, some concessions were
made. Most important among them was the
discontinuation of the study commission on
posts. Also, service with the Reserves was to
be increased to three years. What remained
virtually unchanged was the hardly disguised
proviso t o remove Wood, who was still
considered by the Ainsworth supporters as
the primary opponent.
However, Mr. Stimson proved as loyal to
his Chief of Staff as he proved determined to

outlast Congressional opposition. He favored,
if necessary, a second veto and gained, not
without difficulties, the backing of the
President. As things turned out, the veto did
not have to be used a second time. Congress
was even more averse than the Chief
Executive to seeing the bill making the rounds
anew, only to have it end where it started-in
the House of Representatives. Therefore, the
conferees yielded and on 24 August 19 12 the
bill became law without a single major
provision u n a c c e p t a b l e to the War
Department chiefs.
Henry Stimson in his quiet but determined
way had scored his greatest legislative victory.
At the same time his resolute action and cool
calculation had finally cleared the road for
the reforms so eagerly and consistently
espoused and so long delayed. The Secretary
declared himself "well satisfied." Before
leaving Washington on an inspection trip, he
p o i n t e d o u t t h a t " i m p o r t a n t and
constructive" legislation had been enacted.
The two issues which he stressed most in
several press interviews were the creation of
an Army Reserve and the reorganization of
the tactical structure of the Army.
Ever since he assumed office Stimson had
reiterated the need for a substantial reserve
force. On numerous occasions he referred to
the likelihood that in case of war Regular
units would be quickly depleted without a
commensurate replacement from trained and
r e a d y reserves. He pointed to the
Spanish-American War as having shown the
difficulties in filling up whole regiments. He
also referred to the fact that an effective
reserve system existed in most Western
countries and that the United States was the
exception to this rule.
His ideal was the creation of a large
citizen-army on which the Republic's security
could safely rest. He was much impressed by
the Swiss model, which allowed for the
mobilization of several hundred thousand
men at short notice. In his view it was "the
duty of the citizen to train himself as
promptly as possible . . . as a soldier. . . and
to return as quickly as possible to his normal
civil life."
He also adduced evidence of the
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Secretary of War Stimson (seated, left) and Mr. John Schofield, Chief Clerk, War Department (seated, right),
with other Departmental personnel in 1913. (The portrait of Elihu Root in the background still
hangs today in the Pentagon Office of the Secretary of the Army. It was from this portrait that
Parameters' cover photograph was taken.)

effectiveness of short-term service, being an
"ardent volunteer" himself. One example to
which he referred with obvious pleasure was
that of the 1 lth Cavalry with 70 per cent of
its ranks filled by recruits. He had watched
them train at Western posts which he
inspected in the fall of 1911 and was so
impressed that he commented that their
achievement finally convinced him of the
correctness of the short-term enlistment
theory.
Even before t h e Ainsworth-Wood
controversy reached its climax, it had become
evident to the W a r Department reformers that
their views differed substantially from those
of many members of Congress. A majority in
the House Committee on Military Affairs
25

favored longer rather than shorter service.
Stimson, however, held out steadfastly for
three years with an additional four in the
reserves. Although he had warned in January
1912 that longer service would give to the
Army the character of a professional army of
"a century and a half ago," a majority in
Congress thought otherwise.
A prolonged hassle ensued which only
ended with the passage of the second
appropriations bill in August 1912. Under its
provisions active duty was extended from
three to four years. This was one year more
than the reformers wanted, but one year less
than Congress had originally proposed. The
concurrent lengthening of reserve duty to
three years was at least a first step, as Mr.

Stimson put it, toward the building up of an
efficient reserve.
T h e o t h e r m a j o r reforms, tactical
reorganization and concentration of the
mobile Army, also took final shape with the
passage of the August bill. The phasing out of
obsolete posts could now begin. As the
Secretary had pointed out repeatedly, the
garrisons were dispersed across 24 states and
49 posts. Many of these consisted of only
about 650 men, and Stimson had poignantly
commented that "we have scattered our
Army over the country as if it were merely
groups of local constabulary instead of a
national organization."
He was aware of sectional and even
personal interests in the Congress, whose
members were especially sensitive in an
election year to the closing of posts in their
home states. Yet, he staunchly maintained
that "the bold course was the best thing" and
hopefully proceeded with the phasing-out
plans.* Not only did he anticipate substantial
savings but also an effective redeployment of
troops and specialists thus released.
Stimson had long been convinced that the
s p l i n t e r i n g o f available forces was
counterproductive to his and Wood's goal of a
highly mobile, well trained and organized
Army. Both men favored a return to a tactical
rather than a continuation of geographic
organization into a dozen administrative
departments. Wood had already prepared
plans for the restructuring of units along
divisional lines when Mr. Stimson assumed
office. The new Secretary quickly concurred
and also authorized additional studies by the
General Staff and the Army War College.
On the basis of these studies and his own
analysis he recommended a thorough
reorganization of the mobile Army, then
numbering about 30,000. He proposed that
between six to nine command groups be
established in three main areas (the Atlantic
and Pacific seaboards and the Central region).
*Evidently Mr. Stimson did not reckon with the
longevity of special interests. When he returned to the
War Department in 1940, 18 of the 25 posts that he
had recommended in 1912 for abandonment were
still operative!

In each of these areas there would be
stationed at least one skeleton division
composed of infantry, artillery, cavalry, and
technical troops. Stimson and his advisers
maintained that such division was "the
fundamental army unit" for field operations.*
In addition there would be in each region
from one to three brigades with support
troops.
The Secretary repeatedly emphasized the
advantages of reorganization. It would allow
for integrated training. Commanding officers
would be in actual control of the training and
movements of their troops. Mobilization
would be quicker and more effective. More
officers and men would be available from
detached service. Finally, considerable savings
could be made; a War College study put these
at $5.5 million per annum.
A month before Mr. Stimson left office a
general order of 6 February 1913 provided
for the organization of the mobile Army into
divisions and brigades. Within a week its
effectiveness was first tested. An uprising in
Mexico against President Madero caused
anxious moments in Washington and a
midnight cabinet session in the White House.
The President and his associates remembered
only too well previous troubles along the
Mexican border and in Mexico City. Not only
had they resulted in loss of American lives but
also in numerous frustrations and delays
concerning the mobilization of adequate
protective forces. In spring of 191 1 when
Madero had led his uprising, it had taken
nearly two weeks to assemble a regiment or
two at San Antonio and no less than three
months to concentrate a full-strength division
there! T o add irony to inefficiency, no sooner
had this force been assembled than it was
again disbanded.
There were no adequate covering forces at
the border when Madero was challenged, in
turn, in February 1913; neither did there
exist an emergency strike force t o protect the
US Embassy and citizens in Mexico City.
Much to the relief of the President and his
*Up to this period the largest operational
peacetime unit was the regiment.

c a b i n e t , S timson simply and quickly
dispatched a five sentence order. It
immediately prepared the New England
brigade for intervention from its embarkation
point at Newport News, Virginia. The brigade
was ready to move the next day, but
intervention proved unnecessary. Yet the
reformers had the satisfaction of knowing
that their new organization worked smoothly
and fast.
Among the lesser reforms effected during
Stimson's tenure of office, the consolidation
of the supply services was the most
significant. The Secretary had supported the
proposed merger of the Quartermaster,
Subsistence, and Pay Departments as likely to
benefit both the efficiency and the economy
of the supply services. However, he expressed
opposition to proposed cuts of general
officers i n these services. When the
consolidation o f the various service
departments into a Quartermaster Corps was
finally enacted through the appropriations bill
of 24 August 1912, Stimson declared himself
well pleased. A further organizational
anachronism and administrative monstrosity
had been removed. In addition, some savings
could be made from this long overdue merger.
Progress was also made toward a reduction
in the ever present overflow of paper work.
The General Staff had worked out a master
plan for the simplification of the entire
records system. It was approved by Mr.
Stimson on 11 July 1912 and published in
General Order No. 23. Yet he showed both
his common sense and his sense of fairness
when he retained, after due consideration, a
modified version of the muster rolls, the very
item that had touched off the final showdown
between Generals Ainsworth and Wood.
Some small reductions were also made in
overall operating costs. Stimson had figured
that the individual US soldier was five times
more expensive to maintain than his
European counterparts-and this did not take
into account the much higher subsistence and
pay requirements of the American soldier.
The Secretary took some pride in the fact
that he had succeeded in reducing by $1.75
million the Army estimates for 1914. The
budget for that year remained well below the
hundred million mark.

But his major concern was with the larger
problems of organization and operation. One
of his most innovative plans was the creation
of a National Defense Council. Such body, he
rightly thought, would bring closer together
the civilian and military branches of the
Government. It would also ensure "a
continuous intelligent treatment of our
military and naval problems."
In actuality, it took nearly half a century
to accomplish several of these reforms and
embody such visions. However, the fact that
he had seen the need for these changes attests
to Secretary Stimson's farsightedness and
proves him all the more justified in having
asked three decades earlier for essential and
oftentimes overdue modifications. Given the
brief span left to him in office after the
settling of the all-consuming conflict over
authority, Mr. Stimson did remarkably well.
It stood to reason that men like General
Wood, so much indebted to him, would praise
his improvements in Army organization and
o p e r a t i o n . B u t testimony as to his
achievements and his conduct was also
forthcoming from other and less biased
quarters. Few of the testimonials were more
impressive than that by General William
Crozier. The new President of the Army War
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Brigadier General William Crozier,
President of the Army War College
from 1 September 1912 to 1 July 1913.
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College wrote on 7 March 1913 when Henry
Stimson left office:
I wish to express to you my sense of the
great prominence with which your
methods of administration and your
interest and industry in informing
yourself as to the spirits and needs of the
military machine over which you have
presided stand out in comparison with
what I have been in a position to closely
observe for nearly forty years. It is keen
pleasure to work under a chief in such
conditions.

In perspective, such laudatory comments
appear completely valid. Mr. Stimson in his
first tenure of office at the War Department
had effectively carried forward the Army

reform movement initiated by Secretary Root
a decade earlier. He had given plentiful
evidence of the energy, integrity, tenacity,
and perspicacity which were t o mark his later
career and, specifically, his second tour of
duty as Secretary of War. Above all, he had
convincingly demonstrated in his conduct and
actions alike that a man could be deeply
rooted in a traditional value system yet not
cut himself off from the winds of change and
the light of progress. Among his many
valuable services, his strengthening of the
authority of the Army General Staff must
r a n k as a contribution of profound
significance. Yet it was only one of many
accomplishments in a long life dedicated alike
to national service in peace and war. Even
now some of the innovations of Henry L.
Stimson as Secretary of War before 1914
continue to prove their enduring viability.

Reform, that you may preserve.
-Lord Macaulay
1831

